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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 
16783 
SELMAR RAY PURCELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
. 
-------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted of escape, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1953), 
as amended, for an escape from the Utah State Prison. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
on October 29, 1979, in the Third District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, presiding. 
He was sentenced to 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison, to 
run consecutively with the sentence he was already serving. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment 
and sentence rendered by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant asserted at trial through his own 
testimony .and the testimony of other inmates that in the 
early part of June, 1979 he was housed in medium security 
at the Utah State Prison and was stabbed by two other 
prison inmates (T.193,208,209,222). After being stabbed, 
appellant did not seek medical treatment from prison 
officials; instead he treated the wounds himself with the 
assistance of other inmates (T.194). Appellant did not 
file any grievance with the prison Warden, Program Director, 
Board of Corrections or any other prison administrator, with 
the exception of Al Chavez, a prison counselor, nor did 
he ask to be placed in protective custody (T.225,233-235, 
242-243). Rather, sometime during the three weeks following 
the attack, appellant merely requested that he be transferred 
to minimum security (T.226). The request was considered 
by the block classification committee. One of the members 
of that committee was Mr. Chavez, the counselor to whom 
appellant had reported the stabbing (T.233,234). The request 
was denied and appellant remained in medium security (T.227). 
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Appellant testified at trial that while he 
remained in medium security he was afraid of further 
assaults (T.226,227,229). He further testified that he 
and his friend, Gary Harding, were threatened by other 
inmates, and that reprisals would have been made if the 
attack had been reported (T.224,237). 
On June 24, 1979, appellant and two other inmates 
escaped from the Utah State Prison (T.185,186,228). The 
escape occurred when appellant and Mr. Harding went into 
a room at the prison to set up chairs for a meeting. In 
the room there was a third inmate, Delmont Gentry; however, 
there were no other prisoners in the room at the time. 
Mr. Gentry told appellant and Mr. Harding that the door 
leading out of the prison had been left unlocked (T.186, 
228,250). Appellant and the other inmates left through 
the door and effectuated their escape. There was no evi-
dence presented at trial to indicate that at the time of the 
escape appellant was being threatened with injury or that 
there was an imminent threat of injury if he remained in 
Prison. 
Soon after the inmates escaped, officials at the 
prison discovered their absence, and a search was initiated 
(T.95). All three inmates were apprehended about four 
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hours after their escape (T.230) ., Mr. Harding and Mr. 
Gentry were apprehended at about 4000 West 3500 South in 
Granger (T.123), and appellant was discovered by police 
about one block north of that location hiding behind 
some bushes in front of a church (T.124,260). Appellant 
testified that he hid from police out of "force of habit" 
(T.266). Mr. Harding testified that he intended to remain 
out of prison until he was caught (T.252). After the three 
prisoners were arrested and processed they were returned 
to maximum security at the prison (T.230). 
At trial the judge made three rulings to which 
appellant took exception. First, ~he trial judge refused 
to grant appellant a continuance, which was sought in order 
to secure the presence of Mr. ~havez at trial to corroborate 
appellant's testimony regarding the stabbing (T.256,275). 
The basis of this ruling was that Mr. Chavez's testimony 
would merely be cumulative (T.275). Second, the trial judge 
had stricken all evidence which pertained to appellant's 
claimed defense of compulsion and refused to instruct the 
jury on compulsion (T. 260,268). Third, the trial judge, 
towards the end of the final day of trial, had the court 
room closed to the public on the basis of information that 
he had received from the prison that appellant and the 
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other two defendants were planning to escape (T.244,245,258). 
A court official explained that he had received the infor-
mation from a prison counselor, via the Murray Police 
Department (T.258). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF COMPULSION TO 
THE JURY. 
Appellant has never contended that he did not 
escape from prison. However, he asserts that the trial 
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on his 
claimed defense of compulsion. The standard in determining 
whether the defense of compulsion should be submitted to 
a jury in escape cases varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Respondent submits that under the facts of the case the 
trial court appropriately refused to instruct on compulsion. 
Traditionally, the defense of compulsion finds 
application in situations where one commits a crime under 
the threat that he will be physically harmed by a third 
person if he refuses to act. In the instant case, appellant 
escaped from the Utah State Prison three to four weeks 
after he had allegedly been stabbed by other inmates (T. 193, 
208,209,222). At the time of appellant's escape he was 
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not beinq threatened with imminent injury if he refused 
to escape. Therefore, the defense of compulsion should 
be unavailable to appellant because there was no specific 
demand made by a third party on appellant that he escape. 
This approach was adopted by this Court in 
State v. Pearson, 15 U.2d 353, 393 P.2d 390 (1964). In 
Pearson an inmate, after being assaulted on several 
occasions by other inmates, escaped from prison purportedly 
to avoid further attacks. The defendant was convicted 
of escape, and appealed the decision, claiming that the 
trial court erred in failing to submit the defense of 
compulsion to the jury. This Court held under the then 
existing statute that the defense of compulsion was 
inapplicable where the other inmates did not order him 
to escape. 
In 1973, the Utah legislature passed Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-302 (1953), as amended, which provides: 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense 
when he engaged in the proscribed conduct 
because he was coerced to do so by the use 
or threatened imminent use of unlawful 
physical force upon him or a third person, 
which force or threatened force a person 
of reasonable firmness in his situation 
would not have resisted. 
Section 76-2-302 follows the traditional view of the 
defense of compulsion in that a person will not be guilty 
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of a crime if he was coerced to commit the crime by the 
use, or the threatened inuninent use, of physical force. 
There is no reason to believe that the legislature, in 
passing this statute, intended to extend the defense of 
compulsion to escapes from prison where the escapee was 
not ordered to escape with a concurrent threat of serious 
bodily injury or death if he refused. To allow the defense 
of compulsion to be raised under these circumstances 
would impose a substantial risk on society. Prisoners 
would be less fearful of the consequences of escaping if 
they knew they could raise the defense of compulsion even 
though they had not actually been ordered to escape. 
Therefore, respondent submits that_the trial court 
~ 
properly ruled that the defense of compulsion was inapplicable 
in the instant case because appellant was not ordered to 
escape by the other prisoners (T.260). 
Appellant in his brief cites a series of cases 
that have rejected the approach taken by this Court in 
Pearson and have held that the defense of compulsion may 
be applicable to escapes made by prisoners to avoid being 
attacked. There are two lines of cases cited by appellant. 
Representative of the first line is People v. Lovercamp, 
118 Cal.Rptr. 110 (1974). In Lovercamp the court listed 
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five prerequisites, which had to be met before the court 
would be required to submit the defense of compulsion to 
the jury. Representative of the second line of cases is 
People v. Luther, 232 N.W.2d 184 (Michiaan 1975) and 
Esquebel v. State, 576 P.2d 1129 (N.M. 1978). In these 
cases the courts held that if the defendant made a prima 
facie showing of compulsion, the defense should be submitted 
to the jury, even though the prerequisites listed in 
Lovercamp had not been met. Respondent submits that the 
facts of the instant case do not meet either of the above. 
standards, and a refusal under either to submit the defense 
to the jury would have been proper. 
In Lovercamp, supra, the court, concerned about 
... 
the potential abuse·of the defense of compulsion by escapees, 
very narrowly delineated the situations in which the defense 
could be raised. The court speaking of duress as necessity, 
held that the defense would be applicable only if the 
following five prerequisites were met: 
(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific 
threat of death, forcible sexual attack or 
substantial bodily injury in the inunediate 
future; 
(2) There is no time for a complaint to 
the authorities or there exists a history of 
futile complaints which make anv result from 
such complaints illusory; 
(3) There is no opportunity to resort to 
the courts; 
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(4) There is no evidence of force or 
violence used towards prison personnel 
or other "innocent" persons in the escape~ 
and 
(5) The prisoner irrunediately reports to 
the proper autnorities when he has attained 
a position of safety from the irrunediate 
threat. 
Id. at 115. 
This position was follo~ed by the United States 
Supreme Court in United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 380, 62 
L.E.2d 575, 100 S.Ct. 624 (1980). The defendants in Bailey 
excaped from a District of Columbia jail and remained at 
large for a period ranging from one month to three and a 
half months. On appeal from their conviction for escape 
the Supreme Court held that, where a defendant charge~ with 
escape claims the defense of compulsio~ he must proffer 
evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to 
custody. The court also listed as an indespensible element 
of the defense of compulsion the fact that the threat of 
harm which provoked the escape must be imminent, and the 
defense will fail if the defendant fails to take advantage 
of a reasonable legal alternative. 
Application of the facts of the case to the 
standard set out in Lovercamp and Bailey establishes that 
the judge properly refused to submit the defense of compulsion 
to the jury. First, at the time of the escape there was no 
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threat of physical force being imposed on appellant (T.186, 
228,250). Appellant testified that during the period 
following the attack he was threatened with injury if he 
reported the incident to the officials, but beyond this 
there is no evidence that any other inmates intended to 
injure appellant. General threats of injury, to occur 
at some unspecified time in the future, would not justify 
escape under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302, or under the 
Lovercamp standard because the threat was not imminent. 
Appellant also failed to meet the second 
prerequisite of taking a reasonable legal alternative to 
escape. While appellant claimed that he asked to be sent 
to minimum security, the making of this request alone 
clearly would not meet this requirement. The request is 
equally explainable for other reasons such as mere desire 
for less restrictive custody. Moreover, minimum security 
would in fact, provide greater potential exposure to attack 
because of the reduced level of custody and control. 
Petitioner also failed to officially report the attack. 
He did not ask to be placed in protective custody, nor 
to be transferred to maximum security. Had he done this 
his problem may have been resolved without the need for 
escape. 
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Finally, appellant failed to meet the third 
requirement of reporting to the proper authorities once 
he escaped from prison. In this case, appellant had been 
out of prison for fot.rr ·hour5::when he was apprehended. Durinq 
this time he made no attempt to contact the authorities. 
Further, when the police arrived on the scene he did not 
qo to them and explain the situation; instead he tried to 
elude the police by hidinq from them (T.266). Respondent 
submits that appellant should not benefit from the fact 
that he was quickly apprehended, by claiming that he 
intended to call the authorities, but did not get a chance. 
Appellant has also cited a second line of ·cases 
which has taken an approach different than that of Lovercamp 
and Bailey. Representative of this line of cases is People 
v. Luther, 232 N.W.2d l84 (Michigan 1975). The court in 
Luther held that the defense of compulsion should be 
submitted to the jury if from the evidence presented by 
the defendant the jury could conclude: 
(a) The threatening conduct was 
sufficient to create in the mind of a 
reasonable person the fear of death or 
serious bodily harm; 
(b) The conduct in fact c~used sue~ 
fear of death or serious bodily harm in 
the mind of the defendant; 
(c) The fear or duress was operating 
upon the mind of the defendant at the 
time of the alleged act; and 
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(d) The defendant conunitted the act 
to avoid the threatened harm. 
Id. at 187 .. 
Even under the approach taken in Luther the 
trial court in the instant case was justified in not 
submitting the defense of compulsion to the jur~ Appellant 
in this case failed to establish that the fear of injury 
was operating on his mind when he made his escape. The 
facts show that appellant and Mr. Harding went into a 
visiting room in the prison to set up chairs for a meeting 
(T.228). In the room they encountered Mr. Gentry, who 
told them a door leading out of the pr is on was open.. The 
three went out the door and escaped. Appellant testified 
that at the time of his escape he was still very fearful, 
and that he acted out of fear ·in escaping. However, at 
the time the escape was made no one was in the room 
threatening appellant, nor did appellant produce any evi-
dence to show that he was subject to an inuninent threat of 
attack. The evidence presented only established that he 
had purportedly been warned by other inmates that reprisals 
would be taken if he reported the stabbing. Respondent 
submits that there was only a general threat of attack, 
which might occur somtime in the future, and therefore, 
appellant did not establish that at the time of his escape 
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there was threatening conduct by other inmates sufficient 
to create in the mind of a reasonable person the fear of 
death or serious harm. 
In conclusion, respondent submits application 
of the facts of the instant case to any of the above 
approaches establishes that the trial court did not err 
in refusing to submit the defense of compulsion to the 
jury. Moreover, the determination of whether the defense 
should have been submitted to the jury should properly 
be decided under Pearson, 15 U.2d 353, 393 P.2d 390 (1964). 
In the alternative respondent submits that of the two 
alternate approaches, the process taken by courts in 
Lovercamp and Bailey is the better reasoned approach. 
Bailey recognizes the risk to s?ciety in allowing this 
defense to be raised by escaped prisoners and provides 
certain safeguards to limit those risks. In addition, the 
approach taken by the Supreme Court in Bailey is more in 
line with the approach taken by this Court in Pearson. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
GRANT A CONTINUANCE, AND COMPEL THE 
TESTIMONY OF MR. CHAVEZ. 
During the course of the trial, appellant 
requested a continuance in order to locate Mr. Chavez to 
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testify as a defense witness regarding the earlier stabbing. 
The trial judge denied the request on the basis that the 
testimony would be cumulative (T.275). Appellant's 
right to present competent evidence at trial is subject 
to the trial judge's discretion to exclude admissible 
evidence if the judge finds that the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk that its 
admission will cause any of the following problems: 
(a) necessitate undue consumption of 
time, or (b) create substantial danger 
of undue prejudice or of, confusing the 
issues or of misleading the jury, or 
(c) unfairly and harmfully surprise a 
party who has not had reasonable 
opportunity to anticipate that such 
evidence would be offered. 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In this case, numerous witnesses testified that 
appellant had been stabbed, and that he was fearful of 
further violence after the incident occurred (T.193,209, 
222,248). Appellant sought to have Mr. Chavez testify 
to further corroborate the fact that appellant had been 
stabbed (T.256). In view of the fact that it had been 
firmly established that appellant had been stabbed the 
probative value of this additional testimony was outweighed 
by the risk that a great deal of time would be consumed 
in granting a continuance to secure the presence of 
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Mr. Chavez at trial. Therefore, the evidence was properly 
excluded as cumulative. 
However, even if the exclusion of Mr. Chavez's 
testimony was error this would not be a basis for a 
reversal of appellants conviction. Rule 5 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence provides: 
A verdict or finding shall not be set 
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed, by reason of 
the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless 
(a) it appears of record that the proponent 
of the evidence either made known the sub-
stance of the evidence in a form and by a 
method approved by the judge, or ·indicated 
the substance of the expected evidence by 
questions indicating the desired answers, 
and (b) the court which passes upon the 
effect of the error or· errors is of the 
opinion that the excluded evidence would 
probably have had a substantial influence 
in bringing· about a different verdict or 
finding. 
In the instant case the trial court properly ruled that 
the defense of compulsion was inapplicable in this case. 
Even if Mr. Chavez's testimony had been admitted it would 
have been stricken with the rest of the testimony regarding 
the defense of compulsion. Therefore, the evidence would 
not have had a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict. 
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POINT III 
THE PETITIONER RECEIVED HIS SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO A PUBLIC TRIAL 
BECAUSE THE CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED 
CLOSING THE COURTROOM. 
The right to a public trial is guaranteed to 
a criminal defendant in the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and in Article I, Section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution. However, the right to a public trial 
is not absolute, nor is it a "limitless imperative." 
Lacaze v. United States, 391 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1968). 
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment public trial requirement 
is to guarantee that a defendant will be fairly dealt with 
and not unjustly condemned. In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 
92 L.Ed 682, 68 S.C. 499 (1948). An accomodation must be 
made of an individual's right ·to a public trial and the 
interests of society which might justify the closing of a 
courtroom to the public. United States ex rel. Lloyd v. 
Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1274 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 937 (1975); United States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d 987, 
993 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976). 
The right to a public trial has been interpreted 
as being "subject to the trial judge's power to keep order 
in the courtroom" United States ex rel.. Orlando v. Fay, 
350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965). A judge has the inherent 
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power to preserve order and decorum in the courtroom, 
and in the exercise of that power he may remove spectators 
from the courtroom without infringing on an accused's 
right to a public trial. United States v. Kolbi, 172 
F.2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1949). The trial judge in a criminal 
case, upon the development of a situation indicating that 
armed or open violence may be attempted against those 
participating in the trial, may take necessary precautions 
to avoid such situations. People v. Santo, 43 Cal.2d 319, 
273 P.2d 249 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 959 (1955). 
In People v. Jones, 157 Cal.Rptr. 51 (1979), the judge 
in a juvenile proceeding ordere~ a search of the defendant 
to be made based on information that had been communicated 
to him by the court baliff. A social worker had told the 
baliff that during an interview she had had with the 
defendant he had brandished a gun and threatened to kill 
anyone who tried to take his child. During the search a 
small dagger was found on the defendant. 
In a subsequent proceeding the defendant was tried 
for carrying a concealed weapon. In this proceeding the 
defendant challenged the right of the trial court to make 
the search. The Supreme court of California held: 
[t]he superior court had both the 
statutory and inherent power (see 
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Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.App.3d 
108, 126-127, 116 Cal.Rptr. 713 [cert. 
den., 421 U.S. 1012, 95 S.Ct. 2417, 44 
L.Ed.2d 680]), and duty, "'to preserve 
the order of the court and to see to it 
that all persons . • indulge in no act 
or conduct calculated to obstruct the 
administration of justice'" (People v. 
Merkouris, 46 Cal.2d 540, 556, 297 P.2d 
999, 1010), and "to take whatever steps 
were necessary to see that no conduct 
on the part of any person obstructed 
the administration of justice" (People 
v. Santo, 43 Cal.2d 319, 331, 273 P.2d 
2 4 9 1 2 5 6 [cert. den. , 3 4 8 U.S. 9 5 9, 7 5 
S.Ct. 451, 99 L.Ed. 749]). That power 
and duty patently extended to the 
prevention of threatened courtroom vio-
lence reported, as here, bv an officer 
of the court of her own knowledge. 
Id. at 53 
;n_United Stat?s v. Eisner, supra, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reviewed the propriety of excluding spectators 
from the courtroom d~ring the testimony of a government witness 
because of her fear of testifying before those present in the 
courtroom. This fear could not be substantiated by the trial 
court. Nevertheless, the courtroom was cleared and the trial 
court's order was upheld by the appellate court. The appellate 
court noted that the purpose of a public trial was to guarantee 
fairness but that this right was not absolute, and that a 
balancing of interests might justify closing of the courtroom. 
The court then stated, "The propriety of the trial court's 
action depends on the particular circumstances of the case." 
533 F. 2d 993. See Aaron v. Capps, 507 F. 2d 68 5 (5th Cir.) cert 
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denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975); Snyder v. Coiner, 510 F.2d 224 
{4th Cir. 197 5) • 
The exclusion of the public either in whole or in 
part has been ruled constitutionally acceptable where closed 
proceedings were determined to be necessary in order to preserve 
order and protect the defendant or witnesses. In United States 
ex rel. Smallwood v. LaValle, 377 F.Supp. 1148 (E.D.M.Y.), aff'd 
without opinion 508 F.2d 837 {2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 920 (1975), the trial court did not deny the accused a fair 
and public trial where the trial courtts order excluding spec-
tators from the courtroom was based partly on its concern for 
the state's witness and her unb~rn child and partly on her 
subjective fear of retaliation if she publicly testified. The 
record, significantly, did not establish a real danger to the 
witness' health or to the health of the child or the reasonable-
ness of her fears in terms of actual threats received. In 
Butler v. Smith, 416 F.Supp. 1151 (D.C.N.Y. 1976), the 
temporary exclusion of the public from the court during the 
testimony of two of the state's minor witnesses during a 
murder trial did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to a public trial. The exclusion was to protect the 
witnesses who were found to have a sincere fear of reprisal 
if they testified. In United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 
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520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975), 
the defendant was not denied his right to a public trial by 
the exclusion of the public during the testimony of under-
cover agents in order to maintain the secrecy of the 
identities of the agents. The appellate court determined 
that it was within the trial court's power to make a 
finding that exclusion was required on the basis of his 
judicial knowledge of the role of undercover agents even 
if the,better course would have been a hearing. 
Mr. Gentry, who was convicted with Mr. Harding 
and Appellant, appealed his conviction in State v. Gentry, 
No. 16757 (Utah June 19, 1980) '· (Appendix A), raising this 
same issue that he was denied his right to a public trial. 
This Court rejected his claim stating: 
No one as yet successfully has contended, 
as the appellant seems to do here, that the 
Sixth Amendment's interdiction is applicable 
under any conceivable circumstances, and its 
language never was intended to protect any 
right to subject a magistrate to ignore a 
reasonable or even possible danger of personal 
harm or disruption of the dignity of his 
courtroom. The mere fact that appellant was 
a known escapee at a prior time, of itself 
should warrant exclusion of the public, if 
for no other reason than the spectators 
themselves might suffer harm or even death 
in an escape that a judge may have reason to 
believe may eventuate. 
After Mr. Gentry's conviction was confirmed by this Court, 
he petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ 
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of certiorari. His petition was denied in Gentry v. Utah, 
10 0 S • Ct. ( 19 81) • 
In the petitioner's case, the trial judge 
ordered the courtroom closed in the afternoon of the final 
day of trial (T.224,245). After the courtroom was closed, 
Mr. Harding and Mr. Purcell testified. The judge stated 
that the courtroom had been closed because the court had 
received information from a social worker at the prison, 
via the Murray Police Department, that the defendants would 
try to escape during the proceedings (T.258). 
Pursuant to the judge's duty to insure the 
orderly administration of justi~e and to protect the 
defendants, witnesses and members of the general public in 
attendance at the trial, and to_ prevent the possibility of 
violence, he exercised his right to exclude the public from 
the courtroom. 
The trial judge could reasonably have believed that 
there was a clear danger not only of an escape attempt by 
appellant, but also the possibility of harm to members of 
the public, the defendant, and to witnesses if such an 
attempt should occur. It was entirely possible that if 
such an escape attempt was made, a spectator could have 
been taken hostage. It is equally likely that accomplices 
would be present in the courtroom to aid in the attempt. 
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The proceedings in petitioner's case were closed 
for a minimal duration since the closure did not take place 
until the trial was almost over and at that time it was 
closed only to the extent necessary to prevent an escape. 
The trial judge, in a careful effort to prevent any prejudice 
to the defendant refrained from informing the jury of any 
likelihood of an escape. The jury was not told that the 
doors had been locked and there was no evidence of a 
secret, coercive atmosphere. 
At trial appellant made no request for a pre-closure 
hearing. He voiced only a general objection to the exclusion 
of the public from the courtroom (T.258). Nevertheless 
appellant cites People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 391 N.E.2d 
1335 (N.Y.App. 1979)', claiming that the courts failure to 
hold a hearing to determine the reliability of the information 
received denied him his right to a public trial. Respondent 
would point out that the position taken by the New York 
court in Jones is not constitutionally mandated, nor are 
there any such requirements in the Utah Constitution, Utah 
statutes or Utah case law. Furthermore, other courts 
have rejected the claim that an evidentiary hearing must 
be held before a courtroom may be closed. 
In United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741 
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(9th Cir. 1979) , the appellate court stated that while 
the "better course" i's to hold · an evidentiary hearing on 
the matter, the trial court's order to clear the courtroom 
for a limited portion of the trial should be upheld where 
there was a reasonable basis to conclude that the safety 
of certain witnesses might be in jeopardy, 608 F.2d 747-
748. In United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 
1272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975), the 
appellate court upheld the trial court's order to exclude 
the public solely on the basis of the prosecutor's asserted 
need for confidentiality of undercover agents; the appellate 
court determined that it was within the trial court's 
power to make a finding that exclusion was required based 
on the trial judge's judicial knowledge of the role of 
undercover agents. 
The circumstances in this case also justified 
the closing of the courtroom. The trial judge, on the 
basis of his judicial knowledge of the dangers inherent in 
escape attempts, justifiably closed the trial to the public 
for a short period of time to prevent an escape and to 
protect the public, witnesses, and the appellant himself 
from what could have been a dangerous situation. The fact 
that other alternatives could have been used by the trial 
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judge does not make his actions improper. Respondent 
submits that the trial court did not abuse its inherent 
discretionary powers to prevent interference with orderly 
courtroom procedures by closing the courtroom in appellant's 
case. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE 
CLOSING OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant cites State v. Jordan, 57 Ut 612, 146 
P. 565 (1921), which held that, if a defendant is denied 
his right to a public trial, prejudice is presumed. 
Respondent submits that this does not mean that a violation 
of a defendant's right to a public trial is prejudicial 
per se, but that the error can be overcome when this Court 
is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had 
no prejudicial effect upon the proceedings. State v. 
Scandrett, 24 U.2d 202, 468 P.2d 639 (1970). In Scandrett 
this Court stated: 
There are two differing views as 
to the effect of error in violating a 
constitutional right. On the one hand it 
is sometimes stated that the violation of 
such a right should be deemed prejudicial 
per se; [footnote omitted] and on the other, 
that it may depend upon the circumstances. 
The first proposition has the frailty of 
most generalities. Simply that it is not 
universally true. There are certainly 
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conceivable circumstances where the 
violation of a constitutional right 
could ha~e no possible bearing upon 
any unfairness or imposition upon the 
defendant, or upon a correct deter-
mination of his guilt or innocence. 
We think the correct view, and the 
one which is both practical and in 
keeping with the desired objective 
of fundamental fairness and due process 
of law, is that there is a presumption 
that such error is prejudicial, but that 
it can be overcome when the court is 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that it had no such prejudicial effect 
upon the proceedings. [footnote omitted] 
Correlative to this it is also true that 
when the guilt is shown by other untainted 
evidence so overwhelming that there is no 
likelihood whatsoever of a different 
result in the absence of such error or 
irregularity, there should be no reversal. 
[footnote omitted] To reverse under either 
of such circumstances' results in the 
distortion of the processes of justice 
and the unnecessary proliferation of 
legal proceedings. 
Id. at 643. 
In the instant case the courtroom was closed 
during the afternoon of the last day of trial. After the 
courtroom was closed, the only testimony received was from 
Mr. Hardy and Mr. Purcell. Their testimony covers 
approximately 13 pages of transcript (T.247-255 and T.263-
267). Therefore, the proceedings were closed for a very 
short period of time towards the end of the trial. The 
trial judge was careful not to prejudice the jury by 
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discussing the reasons for closing the courtroom in 
front of them (T.245,258}. Respondent submits that 
even if, arguendo, appellant was denied his right to 
a public trial his conviction should not be reversed 
because he was not prejudiced. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has failed to raise any issues which 
would justify the reversal of his conviction. 
First, the trial court properly ruled that the 
defense of compulsion did not apply to the facts presented 
in this case. This Court has held that the defense of 
compulsion is only applicable where a person is ordered 
to engage in proscribed conduct with a concurrent threat 
of injury if he fails to obey. · In this case appellant 
was not ordered to escape. Therefore, the defense is 
inapplicable. 
Appellant has cited a number of cases which have 
not taken the approach taken by this Court. However, the 
defense of compulsion would be inapplicable even under the 
standards set forth in these cases. 
Under the Lovercamp line of cases appellant must 
show that he was faced with a specific threat of bodily 
injury in the immediate future, that he made attempts to 
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take advantage of legal alternatives, and that he immediately 
reported to officials once the escape was effectuated. 
Appellant did not meet any of these prerequisites. Under 
the Luther line of cases defendant must make out a prima 
facie showing of compulsion before the defense will be 
submitted to the jury. In the instant case appellant 
failed to make this showing because he did not establish 
that at the time of his escape there was any imminent 
threat working on his mind that caused him to escape. 
Therefore, appellant has failed to show that the defense of 
compulsion is applicable to the instant case under either 
of these standards. 
Second, the fact that the testimony of Al Chavez 
was excluded is not a basis for reversal of appellant's 
conviction. The trial judge has the discretion to exclude 
admissible evidence if the probative value of the evidence 
is outweighed by the risk that the admission of the 
evidence would consume too much time. In the instant 
case the probative value of admitting cumulative evidence 
was outweighed by the risk that to much time would have 
been consumed by granting a continuance. Moreover, if error 
occurred, it was harmless. 
Third, appellant was not denied his right to a 
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public trial. The information received by the court 
that the defendants were planning an escape justified the 
closing of the courtroom in order to prevent interference 
with orderly courtroom procedures. However, assuming 
that appellant was denied his right to a public trial, 
his conviction should not be reversed because he was not 
prejudiced. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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:?ZR CURI AM: 
This is an appeal from a conviction by a jury for 
escape from the State Prison. The de:endant does not deny 
guil ~ bu~ contends he was denied his Sixth Amendment guaranty 
of a public trial. 
Near the end of the trial, the judge received a call 
fYom an at~endant at the Prison to the effect that he had rea-
son ~o believe an escape might be attempted by tbe defendan~ 
anc ~is ~wo codefenda~ts. The courtroom ~as tbe~eafter cleared 
of s~ectators, a precau~ionary act which is the basis for 
cl~i~ed error presented on this appeal. The defen~ant had es-
caped once before, fled to California and was re~urned after 
cap~~re, at taxpayers expense. 
No one as yet successfully bas contended, as the a?pel-
:a:t see~s ~o do here, ~hat tbe SiY-th ~~end~ent 1 s interdictio~ 
is a~~licab:e under a~v concei~able circu:rlsta~ces, and its la~­
guag~-never ~as intend~d ~o protect.any right ~o_su~ject a ~ 
. ~~gis::ra:e :o ignore a reasc~able or_ev~n po~s~~~e aanger or 
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for =o o~~er reason tha~ the spectators t~e~selves 2ight suffer 
tar~ or e~e= deatb in a~ esca~e that a judge ~ay have reason ~o 
belie~e ~ar eventuate. 
Ci::a~ion of a~::tori::y a~~ears to be 
a:z:r= t~e trial cour"t here, which affirmance 
:.:::necessary to 
. .. "" .::-1 S -C!""";e oraer OJ.. 
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